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ARTICLES
Duties to Organizational Clients
WILLIAM H. SIMON*
ABSTRACT
Loyalty to an organizational client means fidelity to the substantive legal
structure that constitutes it. Although this principle is not controversial in the
abstract, it is commonly ignored in professional discourse and doctrine. This
article explains the basic notion of organizational loyalty and identifies some
mistaken tendencies in discourse and doctrine, especially the “Managerialist
Fallacy” that leads lawyers to conflate the client organization with its senior
managers. The article then applies the basic notion to some hard cases,
concluding with a critical appraisal of the rationale for confidentiality with
organizational clients.
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INTRODUCTION
Most American lawyers work for organizational clients.1 Yet, lawyers often
think and speak of those clients in individual terms. So does doctrine. Before the
1980s, doctrine rarely acknowledged any differences between organizational and
individual clients, and it still only does so intermittently. When doctrine tries to
confront the distinctive questions presented by organizational representation, it
often lapses into circumlocution or incoherence.
The tendency to think of organizational clients in individual terms arises in
part from psychological and economic pressures that encourage lawyers to
identify these clients with the managers who retain and instruct them. Respond-
ing to criticism that it facilitated Enron’s deceptive financial reporting, attorneys
at Vinson & Elkins asserted, “When clients ask us [if they can do something] our
job is to . . . figure out if there is a legally appropriate way to do it. That’s what we
do.”2 Such talk begs the question of whether managers asking for help with
accounting manipulations intended to deceive shareholders can be plausibly
understood to speak for the “client.”
Question-begging recurs even in disinterested debate. In 2000, Cynthia Ossias,
counsel to the California Department of Insurance, gave information about
apparent unlawful activity by the Commissioner of Insurance to a legislative
1. The most rigorous estimate comes from a survey of Chicago lawyers. It found that in 1994 at least
sixty-four percent of the work of these lawyers was performed for organizational clients (not counting “small
business” organizations) and that the trend was toward greater organizational representation. John P. Heinz
et. al, The Changing Character of Lawyers’Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 751, 765–67
(1998).
2. Patti Waldmeir, Don’t Blame the Lawyers for Enron, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at 14.
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oversight committee.3 A vigorous debate ensued. Some asserted that confidential-
ity forbade her from disclosing the information. Others asserted that there was
some relevant “exception” to confidentiality. Even without an exception,
however, Ossias’s duty would be owed to the client. To assume that disclosure
would breach such a duty begs the question of what the client’s interests were and
who had authority to assert or waive confidentiality on the client’s behalf. Just
because disclosure was plainly against the interest of the incumbent commis-
sioner does not mean that it was against the client’s interest. Nor does it mean that
the incumbent commissioner had authority to decide the issue in a situation
where he had a large conflict of interest.
Even when lawyers ask the right questions, doctrine is often unresponsive. The
key initiatives in professional responsibility doctrine—two similar provisions of
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility and the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers—are tortuous and incoherent, and it is unclear whether they
mandate anything that is not independently required by other law.
Professional responsibility doctrine depends in important ways on the laws
that constitute the organizational client. With Enron, this would mean corporation
and securities law. With the California Department of Insurance, it would mean a
congeries of constitutional, administrative, and statutory law. Here the lawyer
does find dense and relatively coherent bodies of doctrine. Unfortunately, they
are often elusive on issues that most concern lawyers. Yet, grappling with the
substantive ambiguities is inescapable.4
Part II elaborates the principle that loyalty to the organization means respect
for the substantive legal structure that constitutes it and identifies some common
ways in which discussion mistakenly departs from this principle. Part III shows
that these mistakes infect the contributions of the Model Rules and the
Restatement. Parts IV and V consider two classes of cases that remain difficult
even when analyzed under the approach proposed here because the substantive
law that constitutes the client is indeterminate. The first class involves questions
of “reporting out”–disclosure outside the organization for the benefit of the client.
The second involves conflict and confidentiality issues that require difficult
distinctions between organizational insiders and outsiders. Part VI addresses the
grounds for attorney-client privilege with organizations. It demonstrates that,
when the substantive law that constitutes the clients is adequately considered,
3. RICHARD ZITRIN ET. AL, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF L. 665–66 (4th ed. 2013) (summarizing the
Ossias story and reprinting the disciplinary counsel letter); Marisa Huber, Ethics Year in Review, 47 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 867, 904–05 (2007) (reporting State Bar opposition to “exceptions” to confidentiality for cases
such as Ossias’s).
4. The growth of organizational representation is one reason why legal ethics is “falling apart”— that is,
being absorbed into various fields of substantive law. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 959 (2008).
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strong confidentiality protection is harder to justify for organizational clients than
for individual ones.
I. THE BASIC ANALYSIS
To responsibly represent a client, a lawyer needs the ability to answer three
questions: Who speaks for the client, and can thus instruct the lawyer? Who
listens for the client, and thus should receive the information the lawyer is
obliged to communicate? Who acts for the client, and can thus take the actions
needed to make commitments on behalf of the client?
To appreciate the distinctive professional responsibility issues in organiza-
tional representation, it is helpful to start by considering the lawyer’s duties to
jointly represented individuals in the absence of organization. Professional
responsibility doctrine demands sensitivity to potential conflicts among individu-
als who seek joint representation, and it forbids joint representation when the
conflicts are too severe.5 Even sophisticated clients are sometimes deemed
incapable of deciding to run the risks of joint representation in situations of
conflict.6
A major reason for wariness about joint representation is that it tends to be both
cumbersome and fragile. It is cumbersome because, with joint representation, the
answer to our three questions is likely to be: everyone. Decision or action by the
group requires unanimity, and notice to the group requires notice to each
member.7 Joint representation is fragile because any disagreement within the
group can end the representation. Each client can terminate her relation to the
lawyer at will. She then becomes a former client who can veto the lawyer’s
continued representation of the others in any substantially related matter in which
her interests are adverse.8 And, the lawyer is advised to end the joint
representation on her own initiative when conflict, actual or potential, intensifies
beyond the threshold of consentability.
These at least are the presumptive rules. There may be some room for
individuals to commit contractually to binding less-than-unanimous decisions,
notice to designated representatives, and waiver of the right of a withdrawing
participant to veto continued representation of the others. But, the permissible
range of such agreements is unclear, and they are likely to be scrutinized
skeptically after collaboration has collapsed. Moreover, there are no standard,
5. E.g., Baldessarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458 (N.J. 1993) (holding joint representation of buyer and seller in a
complex real estate transaction nonconsentable).
6. E.g., id.
7. Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, Inc., 181 A.2d 579, 583–84 (Del. 1962).
8. E.g., Brennans’, Inc. v. Brennans’ Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that when
one or more clients withdraw from a joint representation the lawyer may not continue to represent one without
consent of the others).
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broadly recognized forms for such agreements in many situations.9
Once the collaborators adopt an established organizational form, everything
changes. Doctrine insists that the subject of the representation is now an “entity”
rather than an “aggregate” of individuals. It assumes that internal conflict
virtually never requires the lawyer to withdraw.
It is arguable that doctrine is excessively sensitive to conflict in the joint
representation situation and under-sensitive to it in the organizational situation.10
But, some general difference in orientation is justified by a basic difference
between unorganized and formally organized collaborators: formal organization
entails adoption of explicit norms designed to make it possible for a group to
speak, listen, and act without unanimity. These norms are of three general types.
There are decision rules that allocate presumptive responsibility and specify
procedures. There are fiduciary duties that require that decision-making responsi-
bility be exercised in the interests of the organization, rather than in the individual
interests of the decision-makers. And, there are property norms that distinguish
the organization’s assets from the personal assets of the constituents and delineate
the relative claims on organizational assets by constituents. The fiduciary norms
qualify the decision rules, making authority conditional on its exercise in the
interest of the organization. The property norms give definition to fiduciary
duties, indicating which constituent interests should be deemed interests of the
organization.
The move to formal organization makes it possible to speak of loyalty to an
entity. Loyalty to an entity means fidelity to the legal structure that constitutes it.
It is this structure that gives “legal personality” to the group. The structure
enables the group to speak, listen, and act as a unity without consensus. In
principle, the structure enables determination in situations of conflict which of
the contesting positions should be treated as that of the client.
Sometimes the move to organizational form is too hasty or casual to produce
an institutional structure sufficiently dense to perform these functions. Or
sometimes, the structure is never integrated into the actual operation of the
organization. Small groups may adopt an organizational form for reasons
peripheral to the basic purposes of their collaboration. Small businesses often
9. E.g., Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp.2d 1046, 1051 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding void contract
among 200 individual plaintiffs giving settlement authority to representative sub-group); Tax Authority, Inc. v.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 514–15 (N.J. 2006) (holding void contract among 154 individual plaintiffs
providing that each would accept settlement approved by weighted majority).
10. Consider the famous episode in which Louis Brandeis undertook to negotiate a forbearance agreement at
the request of a distressed debtor and his creditors. Asked whom he represented, Brandeis characterized himself
as “counsel to the situation.” Bar leaders accused Brandeis of violating conflicts norms, and some ethicists
would do so today. John Frank admonished: “Lawyers are not retained by situations, and the adversary system
assumes they represent one interest at a time.” John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 702 (1965). But lawyers represent organizations routinely, and organizations of substantial size
virtually always involve multiple interests with potential for conflict.
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incorporate to gain limited liability without expecting any basic change in their
informal modes of operation. Just as corporate doctrine sometimes “pierces the
corporate veil” in order to deny limited liability in such situations, professional
responsibility doctrine sometimes disregards organizational form. It does so
where constituents seem to have assumed that unanimity would continue to be
the basis for their collaboration and the move to legal formality has not produced
meaningful answers to our three questions. The courts then default to joint
representation norms.11
Commonly, however, the move to organization will produce answers to the
lawyer’s questions across a broad range of situations. Take the business
corporation. State law gives virtually plenary authority to the board. The
corporation, it says, is managed “by and under the direction” of the board.12
Shareholder approval is needed for a few major matters, such as mergers and
article amendments.13 Senior managers have presumptive authority over ordinary
business matters and sometimes more specialized tasks like certification of
records, but, in general, authority ultimately derives from the board. The board
makes some decisions itself and delegates others. It specifies who will execute
decisions on behalf of the organization. The allocation of authority to decide and
execute will usually answer at least implicitly our three questions.
Complexity is added by fiduciary duties—the duty of care, which requires
minimal competence, and the duty of loyalty as it applies to conflicts of
interests.14 Decisions that an agent would normally have authority to make may
be unauthorized if made recklessly or in the selfish interests of the agent.15 The
generally hierarchical nature of corporate authority indicates the proper course of
action in situations of doubt. The lawyer can move up the ladder to the next level.
As long as the officer at that level has decisional authority and there are no
questions about her ability to decide with care and loyalty, she can assess the
conflicted decision of the subordinate on behalf of the organization. Until we get
to the top, hierarchy provides recourse in difficult situations.
11. E.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (treating representation of
two-person corporation as joint representation for confidentiality purposes); Woods v. Superior Court, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (treating representation of two-person corporation as joint representation for
conflicts purposes); Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, 181 A.2d 579, 583–84 (Del. 1962) (treating representation of
three-person corporation as joint representation for the purpose of lawyer’s fiduciary duty to provide
information to clients).
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014); see generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 55–88 (2d ed. 2009).
13. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 12.
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6425 (2014) (denying directors right to vote on matters with respect to which
they have financial interests); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (holding that,
although statute and by-laws gave directors authority to schedule shareholders meeting, they could not use their
power strategically to thwart a shareholder challenge to board).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6425; Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
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Thus, in the private sector the basic approach to entity representation has three
elements. We start with the rules that allocate authority to instruct, listen, and act.
We then consider whether actions under these rules are consistent with fiduciary
duty, interrogating decisions that seem reckless or self-interested. With hard
cases, we move up the ladder seeking to induce senior agents to resolve
ambiguity or discipline misconduct.
In the public sector, the same basic analysis applies, though there are distinct
problems and ambiguities. There is more variation across jurisdictions in the
organizational structure of public organizations than of private ones. Moreover,
hierarchies tend to get narrower at the top; so, the prospect of moving up the
ladder is less often plausible in the public sector. For example, the President
presides formally over the entire federal executive branch and cannot attend to
more than a tiny fraction of the matters over which he has authority. It would
rarely be plausible to tell a government lawyer to refer difficult questions to the
President, as corporate lawyers are expected in some situations to refer them to
the board of directors. Moreover, there are ambiguous limitations on the
President’s authority to control some executive decisions where Congress (or
perhaps custom) has allocated decisional authority to specific officers.16
In addition, there is more ambiguity in the public sector about horizontal
authority relations. Federal statutes give the Solicitor General and the Attorney
General control over federal litigation to a degree that is ambiguous but clearly
exceeds that accorded lawyers for private organizations.17 States have multiple
elected executive officials whose relative authority is often disputed. State
attorneys general often have constitutional authority to make litigation decisions
on behalf of agencies or officers over the objection of senior administrators and
even governors.18 In both federal and state systems, prosecutors have great
autonomy with respect to decisions to bring criminal charges. Public whistle-
blower statutes that mandate or permit reporting outside the reporter’s line of
authority to the attorney general further complicate the picture.19
16. See Peter Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 696 (2007).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“[T]he conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer
thereof is a party . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice”); 28 U.S.C. § 518 (2012) (“[T]he
Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals” in the higher federal
courts). The Solicitor General frequently refuses requests from line officials to file appeals and occasionally
confesses error and agrees to vacate judgments in favor of the government. Cornelia T.J. Pillard, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 709 (2005).
18. William Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and the Lessons of the
Divided Executive, 115 YALE L. J. 2446 (2006).
19. Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1073–91
(1985).
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Such concerns make cases like Cynthia Ossias’s hard, but they should not
distract attention from the fact that the most common situations public lawyers
encounter involve relations with middle and lower-level officials operating
within fairly well-defined hierarchical authority structures. As Geoffrey Miller
says, the government “lawyer’s duties run to the officer who has the power of
decision over the issue. In the vast majority of cases, that officer will be the head
of the department in which the attorney works.”20 Here the basic analysis—
looking first to decision-making rules, then to fiduciary duties, with climbing the
ladder as a resort in doubtful cases—applies.21
The basic analysis explains a doctrinal mystery that often goes unremarked—
why authority to invoke or waive the organization’s confidentiality rights usually
belongs to organizational agents different from those who made the confidential
communications. The mystery arises from the inconsistency of this norm with the
rationale for confidentiality. The rationale is that confidentiality is necessary to
induce disclosure to the lawyer. Disclosure is valued because it leads to more and
better legal advice, and legal advice is valued because it tends to deter
wrongdoing.22 However, once control over confidentiality is given to the
organization rather than the communicating agent, confidentiality cannot play an
important role in inducing disclosure to the lawyer. Confidentiality will not block
the lawyer from disclosing within the organization, and it will not prevent the
organization from disclosing outside, no matter how harmful internal or external
disclosure is to the agent. It would be a simple matter to re-assign control to the
agent, and if the conventional rationale for confidentiality were correct, doing so
would have a net deterrent effect on wrongdoing. However, such a revision
would require the lawyer to take instruction on disclosure with respect to each
communicating agent’s statements from someone different from those authorized
to instruct him on other issues. The communicating agents might have interests
different from those of the organization, and the relevant substantive law does not
provide any mechanism for reconciling differences. Thus, the lawyer would be in
20. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1293, 1298 (1987).
21. The analysis here should be distinguished from a pioneering effort by Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., in Triangular
Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 40 (1987). Hazard suggests that
organizational constituents should be treated as joint clients in “normal circumstances” but that, in situations of
conflict, a “rule of precedence” should dictate who instructs the lawyer. This approach is not viable. First, even
in absence of conflict, the lawyer needs answers to the three questions. The only answer joint representation
gives is unanimity, which is often impractical or undesirable. Second, the source and content of Hazard’s “rule
of precedence” is mysterious. It is not discoverable in professional responsibility doctrine, and substantive
organizational doctrine provides, not a single rule, but a congeries of rules. This early Hazard approach is called
the “group theory” in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET. AL, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 18.03, at 13–18 (4th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING]. The authors interpret Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13 to reject the group theory in favor of an “entity” theory. My argument should be understood as an
interpretation of the “entity” theory.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt.¶ 2 (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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a position that resembles joint representation. However, joint representation is
impermissible without informed consent, which generally requires a sharing of
information, and it collapses when severe conflict arises. Assigning control over
disclosure to the organization’s general authority structure avoids these dangers.
The basic analysis also allows us to identify two common ways of thinking and
talking about organizational representation as mistaken. The first is the Manage-
rialist Fallacy. It involves the failure to observe the distinction between the
organization’s interests and those of its senior managers. Vinson & Elkins’s
statement that it was merely doing what the “client asked us to do” when it
facilitated Enron’s misleading financial reporting is an example. The lawyers
were asked for help by Enron senior managers, including some who were later
convicted of financial fraud. Whether their requests can plausibly be attributed to
“the client” depends on whether they had authority to make such requests. Those
who criticize the firm assume that they did not have authority, and Vinson &
Elkins’s response begs this question.
A more subtle manifestation of the Managerialist Fallacy occurs in discussions
of corporate attorney-client privilege in derivative suits. The influential Fifth
Circuit case Garner v. Wolfinbarger holds that management cannot routinely
assert privilege to block a derivative plaintiff’s effort to discover pertinent
conversations with corporate counsel.23 The case holds that the trial court should
evaluate the situation contextually in terms of such factors as the number of
shares represented by the plaintiff, the facial plausibility of the claim of
managerial wrongdoing, the importance of the information to the plaintiff’s case,
and the likelihood that disclosure might reveal publicly trade secrets or other
proprietary information.
Garner is not strongly deferential to managerial discretion, but the Manageri-
alist Fallacy enters in the common characterization of its doctrine as an exception
to the attorney-client privilege.24 The doctrine does not, in fact, function as an
exception, and that is not how the Garner court described it. An exception to
privilege characteristically makes information discoverable by any litigant,25 but
only shareholders can invoke the Garner rule. In explaining the rule, the court
emphasized that the plaintiffs are constituents of the organization, and they are
purporting to speak in its interest. To allow management routinely to invoke
privilege would “preserve [managerial judgment] from being questioned by those
for whom it is, at least in part, exercised.”26
23. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. E.g., Robert Summerhays, The Problematic Expansion of the Garner v. Wolfinbarger Exception to the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 TULSA L. J. 275 (1996); WalMart Stores v. Ind. Elec. Workers Pension
Tr., 95 A.3d 1264, 1270 (Del. 2014).
25. That is the effect, for example, of the best-recognized example—the “crime-fraud exception.” E.g.,
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
26. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101. The court says further, “[t]he attorney-client privilege still has viability for the
corporate client . . . . But where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically
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Garner, then, is not about the availability of the privilege to organizations but
about who decides on behalf of the organization whether to assert the privilege
during internal disputes. Clients often choose to waive the privilege, and the
shareholder plaintiff asserts that waiver is in the organization’s interest. The law
presumes that the board speaks for the organization on such matters, but the
function of the shareholder suit is to enable rebuttal of that presumption. When
the plaintiff demands the information, management may have a conflict of
interest, and corporate law generally qualifies managerial authority when there
are conflicts.
The same analysis applies to the position of the Restatement of Trusts and
some courts that a trustee may not assert privilege to block discovery by a
beneficiary.27 The doctrine is often referred to as the “fiduciary exception,” but,
again, the term is inappropriate. Where the fiduciary is alleged to have breached
his duty, the question is not whether there is a privilege but whether the fiduciary
has authority to invoke it. The privilege does not belong to the fiduciary
simpliciter. It belongs to the trust, and the question becomes, who speaks for the
trust? Or alternatively, it belongs to the trustee in his official capacity, and the
question is whether he should be recognized as speaking in his official capacity.
The second mistaken tendency can be called the Collectivist Fallacy. It
assumes that a corporation’s property interests are limited to the preservation or
maximization of its aggregate wealth and that interests in relative claims on that
wealth are no more than individual constituent interests. The Collectivist Fallacy
is on display in cases that dismiss claims against corporate lawyers for assisting
unlawful dilution or outright expropriation of shareholder interests by saying that
the organization’s lawyer owes duties only to the entity and not to the constituent
plaintiff.28 Such cases seem to assume that an agent does not violate a duty to the
organization when she impairs a constituent’s interests as long as aggregate
to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require
that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be
invoked in the particular instance.” Id. at 1103–04.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173; accord, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 84
(2000). Case law on whether the trustee can assert privilege against the beneficiary is divided. See David L. J.M.
Skidmore & Laura E. Morris, Whose Privilege is it Anyway? The Fiduciary Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, PROB. PROP., Sept.–Oct. 2013.
28. An extreme example is Skarbrevik v. Cohen England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 699–700 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991), where in order to facilitate the wrongful dilution of a minority shareholder, the lawyer filed Articles
of Amendment to eliminate the pre-emptive rights clause in the charter with a declaration reciting falsely that
the amendment had been approved by a shareholder vote. For a similar holding, see also Felty v. Hartung, 523
N.E. 2d 555, 557–58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). Some cases recognize potential lawyer liability in these situations.
See, e.g., Chem-Age Indus. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 767–68 (S.D. 2002).
Some courts characterize the lawyer’s wrong as aiding and abetting a managerial breach of fiduciary duty.
E.g., Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (1999). Since lawyers have fiduciary duties to their organizational
clients, it is not clear why these courts do not speak of the lawyers as directly violating their own fiduciary
duties. However, the distinction is probably unimportant practically as long as the jurisdiction recognizes
secondary liability for fiduciary breach.
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wealth is unaffected. To put it differently, they assume that an organization has no
interest in the integrity of its distributive arrangements.
The assumption recurs in comments to Section 96 of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers on organizational representation. In distinguishing
between harm to the organization and harm to a constituent, the drafters offer two
examples involving a corporate repurchase engineered by a controlling share-
holder and his nominees on the board at the expense of a minority.29 The
discussion stipulates that the controlling shareholder’s actions might violate a
fiduciary duty that the shareholder owes to the minority.30 The question is
whether the corporation’s lawyer has a duty to resist. Although the response is
hedged with evasive ambiguity, it says in essence that the lawyer’s duty
substantially depends on whether the minority will sue and the “[c]lient will
likely occur substantial litigation expense.”31 If the company is likely to suffer
litigation expense, the lawyer has a duty to resist the plan; otherwise, she is not
obliged to even advise against it. The implication is that unauthorized managerial
action is no concern of the lawyer unless it affects aggregate wealth.
It is true that all constituent interests are not corporate interests, but ultimately,
all organizational interests must be the interests of at least some constituents.
Corporate interests are the constituent interests incorporated into the corpora-
tion’s legal structure. With or without litigation expense, the expropriation of a
minority’s stake in violation of that structure should be deemed harm to the
organization. Distributive norms are among those that make it possible for us to
treat the organization as a unity, or legal person. People’s willingness to invest
and work in organizations depends on the distributive norms just as much as on
the others.32
II. THE IRRELEVANCE (AT BEST) OF MODEL RULE 1.13 AND RESTATEMENT
SECTION 96
If we put hard cases aside for the moment, the basic analysis seems
straightforward and uncontroversial. Yet, it is important to articulate it because
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96, cmt. g, illus. 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
30. Id.
31. Id. My complaint about evasive ambiguity arises from the fact that, in addition to distinguishing the two
cases by the likelihood of litigation expense, the drafters stipulate that in the case with the high likelihood the
lawyer “has reason to know that the plan violates applicable corporate law,” while in the other case there is
merely a shareholder claim of illegality about the merits of which the drafters say nothing. Since greater
confidence about the illegality of board action obviously weighs toward intervention, the addition of this second
factor does nothing other than generate ambiguity about the extent to which the likelihood-of-expense factor is
driving the difference in conclusions.
32. The corporate doctrine that imposes a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders to respect minority
interests is itself a rejection of the Collectivist Fallacy, which sometimes led earlier substantive cases to treat the
corporation as indifferent to the distributive effects of procedurally valid decisions. For an influential critique of
these earlier cases, see Victor Brudney & Marvin Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974).
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much prominent professional responsibility authority on these matters not only
fails to do so but addresses the issues in an ambiguous and circuitous way.
The most important sources are Model Rule 1.13 and Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers section 96. Both of them state that the lawyer representing an
organization should understand the client through the actions of its authorized
constituents. So far, so good. Then, they proceed to address the lawyer’s
responsibilities where she encounters potentially unauthorized or harmful agent
behavior.33 However, instead of addressing this situation generally, they proceed
to treat as paradigmatic what is in fact a specialized situation. And they fail to
treat this situation consistently with the basic analysis. At critical points, they
lapse into circularity, qualifying their specific directives by the general norm—
“best interest of the client”—that the directives were supposed to elucidate.
These rules would be merely trivial were it not for the possible negative
implication that their precepts set out fully lawyer duties in situations involving
potentially unauthorized or harmful behavior. Understandably, Rule 1.13 is
sometimes read as exhaustive.34 This is a mistake.
Rule 1.13 and Restatement section 96 direct our attention to situations where
the lawyer “knows” that (1) an agent of the client is behaving unlawfully and (2)
the agent’s conduct is likely to harm the organization. When these conditions are
satisfied, the rule says, anti-climactically, that the lawyer is supposed to act in the
“best interest of the organization.” The pre-2003 (old) version of Rule 1.13, still
in use in many states, and section 96 say that the lawyer “may” then take certain
actions, including reporting to “higher authority” or “supervisory authority” in
the organization. The new Rule 1.13 says the lawyer “shall” report to “higher
authority” unless she believes such reporting is not “necessary” to protect the
organization’s interests. The Rule (but not the Restatement35) then addresses the
situation where the “highest authority” fails to act or ratifies the illegal-harmful
33. The statement that the lawyer represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents
is in subsection (a). The reporting-up and -out provisions are in 1.13(b) and (c). All subsequent references to
Rule 1.13 refer to subsections (b) and (c).
34. See, e.g., BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 117–19 (4th
ed. 2013). This widely used (and generally excellent) text appears to assert that, in a case where “a crucial
predicate for up-the-ladder reporting” under 1.13 is missing (because unlawful conduct is unlikely to be
discovered and thus harm the corporation), the lawyer has no duty to report upward, or even discretion to do so.
The discussion acknowledges that the Sarbanes-Oxley rules might dictate a different result if the client were a
public corporation, but it does not consider at all the relevance of the duty under Model Rule 1.4 to report
material information to “the client” or common law fiduciary duties. See Oasis West Realty v. Goldman, 51 Cal.
4th 811 (Cal. 2011) (holding that disciplinary rules do not pre-empt common law fiduciary duties); FDIC v.
Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1546–48 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding on fiduciary grounds that lawyer can be liable for
failure to inform corporate client’s board of officers’ wrongdoing).
35. The comments say that the Restatement “does not take a position” on whether and when reporting out is
permissible. But the same paragraph says, inconsistently, that the issue “is determined primarily by” the general
confidentiality provisions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96, cmt. ¶ 9 (AM. LAW
INST. 1998). The general confidentiality provisions would rarely, if ever, authorize disclosure in the situation on
which Rule 1.13 focuses. See notes 40-41 below and accompanying text.
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conduct. Old Rule 1.13 says that in this situation the lawyer “may resign.” New
Rule 1.13 says that the lawyer “may” report outside the organization to the extent
necessary to prevent harm.36
Note how oddly limited and qualified these rules are. In the first place, they
apply only when the lawyer “knows” of harmful wrongdoing, and the rules define
knowledge as “actual knowledge of the fact in question,” which implies a high
degree of conviction.37 Yet, under traditional fiduciary principles, the lawyer’s
disclosure duties are defined in terms of materiality; the fiduciary should disclose
information the client needs or wants to make decisions.38 Information that only
suggests a significant possibility of wrongdoing or harm often requires investiga-
tion or consideration by the client and should thus be reported when the relevant
client decision-makers are not aware of it.39
Second, in defining the core case, the rules unaccountably depart from the
authority principle, which they earlier and plausibly invoke. The authority
principle suggests that the key concern about agent behavior is with unauthorized
behavior. But the Rule 1.13 reporting duty is triggered only with illegality and
likely harm. In fact, managerial misconduct could be material without satisfying
either condition. Imagine, for example, a case in which a manager is committing
large sums of money in violation of specific instructions from the board. The
conduct is not otherwise illegal, and the lawyer has no idea whether it will prove
harmful. This case is outside Rule 1.13, though it is surely within the fiduciary
duty to inform. Moreover, even if illegal and harmful behavior were the exclusive
concerns, there would be no justification for demanding both as conditions for
climbing the ladder.
Third, even in the urgent situation where both persistent illegality and likely
harm are present, old Rule 1.13 and section 96 mention reporting-up only as
something the lawyer “may” do. Both say the lawyer should act in the “best
interest” of the client; so they imply that reporting up is mandatory when the
“best interest” requires it. However, they do not suggest any strong likelihood
36. Fifteen states, including the four most populous (California, Texas, Florida, and New York) have rules
resembling old Model Rule 1.13 that use permissive language with respect to reporting up and do not authorize
reporting out unless disclosure is permitted by the general confidentiality Rule 1.6. Twenty-nine states have
rules resembling new Model 1.13 that make reporting up presumptively mandatory and use permissive
language with respect to reporting out. The remaining states and the District of Columbia have rules that depart
from old 1.13 either by making reporting up presumptively mandatory or by authorizing reporting out but not in
both ways. See Appendix.
37. MODEL RULES R. 1(f).
38. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2005) (stating that trustee has a duty to
provide “material information needed by the beneficiaries for the protection of their interests”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (AM. LAW INST. 1957) (stating that the agent has a duty to give the principal
“information that is relevant to the affairs entrusted to him and which [the agent knows] the principal would
desire to have”).
39. See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. (1996)) (holding that corporate
managers have duty to seek “sufficient information. . . to enable them to reach informed decisions”).
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that reporting up will be in the client’s best interest. Yet, it is difficult to think of a
situation satisfying the two conditions in which reporting up would not be the
“best interest” course, and the comments give no examples of such a situation.
New Rule 1.13 seems to recognize this and sets out a presumption that reporting
up is the best-interest course. It provides that the lawyer “shall” report up unless
doing so is not in the client’s “best interest.” However, like the old rule, it implies
that there are situations where reporting-up would not be required without giving
any examples.
Fourth, old Rule 1.13 implies that, where the “highest authority” persists in or
ratifies the conduct in question, the lawyer cannot report-out even when that
would be in the client’s best interests. The only option it mentions is resigning.
More plausibly, new Rule 1.13 says that the lawyer “may” report out if
“necessary to prevent substantial injury” to the client. If reporting out is
necessary to prevent substantial harm, how can it not be a duty?
A further layer of incoherence is added in versions of old Rule 1.13 that refer to
Rule 1.6, the general rule on confidentiality, as governing reporting out.40 The
exceptions to confidentiality in Rule 1.6 are designed to enable the lawyer to
prevent harm to third parties (and to the lawyer herself). They make no sense in
the reporting-out context. The versions of Rule 1.6 that allow disclosure to
prevent non-bodily harm—the only kind of harm that organizations can
suffer—typically limit permission to harms arising from illegal acts by the
client.41 In the reporting-out scenario, the client organization is the victim of the
act. The constituent perpetrator whose acts threaten harm to the organization is
not the client. Thus, Rule 1.6 would seem irrelevant to reporting-out scenarios.
For clarity and coherence, Rule 1.13 and section 96 compare unfavorably with
two other rules. The Sarbanes-Oxley attorney rule partly pre-empts Rule 1.13 for
40. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (N.Y. BAR ASS’N 2009) (stating that where the
“highest authority” persists after the lawyer has reported up in illegal and harmful conduct, “the lawyer may
reveal confidential information only if permitted by Rule 1.6”); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)
(OHIO ST. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“The discretion or duty of the lawyer for an organization to reveal information
relating to the representation outside the organization is governed by Rule 1.6(b) and (c).”).
41. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (N.Y. BAR ASS’N 2009); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(2)-(3) (OHIO ST. BAR ASS’N 2007). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (AM.
LAW. INST. 1998) has the same limitation. Under substantive law an agent’s unauthorized act is sometimes
attributed to the organizational principal even when it turned out to be harmful to the principal. See generally
Samuel Wasserman, Can the Trustee Recover? Imputation of Fraud to Bankruptcy Trustees in Suits Against
Third-Party Service Providers, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 365 (2008) (discussing the bankruptcy doctrine that estops
claims on behalf of the corporation against agents whose illegal behavior was intended to benefit the
corporation). So in applying the Rule 1.6 exception for criminal acts by the client to the reporting-out situation,
we might distinguish between agents who harm the organization directly from agents whose unlawful acts are
intended to benefit the organization but turn out to harm it because they are discovered. Arguably, the latter
could be deemed acts by the client that trigger permission to report under the relevant versions of Rule 1.6. Note,
however, that this approach results in broader permission to report out when the organization is complicit in the
wrongdoing than when it is an innocent victim. Where reporting out is designed to protect the client, this makes
no sense.
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public company clients and requires securities counsel to report up whenever she
encounters evidence of a violation of fiduciary duty or the securities laws.42 It
provides generally clear and specific directives about how to do so. Only when
we get to the situation where the highest authority persists in or ratifies wrongful
conduct does it waffle, providing that the lawyer “may” report out without
offering any guidance about when and how to do so.43
More generally, Rule 1.4 formulates the lawyer’s duty of communication to
clients generally and provides that the lawyer “shall” “keep the client informed”
about the representation and shall “explain a matter to the extent necessary the
client to make informed decisions.” This Rule embraces all the reporting-up
scenarios of Rule 1.13, has no eccentric limitations, and clearly makes disclosure
a duty.
Since Rule 1.4 and the common law duty of care cover all the situations that
Rule 1.13 addresses, whether Rule 1.13 does any work depends on whether it
pre-empts these other rules. Again, the rules are coyly ambiguous on this point.
Some features of 1.13—notably the negative implication in the old rule that
where the board persists or ratifies the constituent’s conduct, the lawyer’s only
option is to withdraw—seem designed to preclude broader duties. On the other
hand, the Rules do not pre-empt anything explicitly, and the comments state that
responsibilities under Rule 1.13 are “concurrent” with “those provided in other
Rules.”44 If the Rule does not pre-empt, it is superfluous.
The contortions and ambiguities of Rule 1.13 are largely due to the
Managerialist Fallacy. Commentators report that discussion of the Rule within
the bar persistently conflates reporting to protect the client with reporting to
protect third parties.45 Thus, lawyers speak of reporting-up under this Rule as an
exception to the duty of confidentiality, and they oppose reporting out as
compromising client loyalty. The insistence on harm and illegality as precondi-
tions for reporting up reflect an inapposite analogy to Rule 1.6, which makes
these factors preconditions for disclosure to protect third-party interests. These
positions assume that the manager is the client to whom loyalty is owed.
III. HARD CASES: REPORTING OUT
Sometimes it may be clear that constituent activity is unauthorized or harmful
but not clear to whom the lawyer should report the activity. This will usually be
42. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2004).
43. Id.
44. MODEL RULES R. 1.13, cmt § 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The comment states further on that “in particular”
1.13 does not “limit or expand” responsibilities under four specified rules dealing with conflicts, withdrawal,
and misrepresentation. Strangely, the list does not include Rule 1.4 on informing the client, even though Rule
1.13(b) is primarily concerned with informing organizational clients.
45. See generally Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate
Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289 (1987); HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note
21, at 8.02, 18.15.
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the situation when the lawyer has exhausted options for reporting up and there is
no specified path for reporting out.
The lawyer has exhausted options for reporting up when she reaches what Rule
1.13 calls the “highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization.” This
term is itself ambiguous. In the private sector, the board is usually thought of as
the highest authority. However, there are a few actions that the board cannot
authorize without shareholder approval, such as article amendments, mergers,
dissolutions, and certain conflict-of-interest transactions. Moreover, the sharehold-
ers can take initiative to limit the authority of the board in various ways. So, at
least under substantive law, the shareholders are sometimes part of the “highest
authority.”
If shareholders are sometimes the “highest authority” or part of it, could the
lawyer plausibly be expected to report to them? With small corporations, it may
be feasible for the lawyer to communicate directly with shareholders, and cases
that treat small-corporation representation as joint representation of constituents
legitimate this approach. In the Restatement stock-repurchase scenario, the
lawyer’s duty to disclose to the corporate client could reasonably be interpreted
to require him to report information to the minority shareholder. Disclosure to the
minority might seem the best way to protect the client’s interest in the integrity of
its distributive arrangements, and managers engaged in an unlawful course of
action would lack authority to instruct the lawyer otherwise. However, with large
corporations, communicating with the shareholders would be tantamount to
going public. It would often be less disruptive to report out to the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) or an attorney general.46
In the public sector, the top of the ladder will often be an elected official. For
instance, in the Ossias case, the Commissioner of Insurance was an elected
official not subject to instruction or removal by the Governor; so, he could
plausibly be understood to be the top of the client ladder. But, other situations are
more ambiguous. Often, the official who seems formally at the top, such as the
President or a Governor, will not be practically accessible. Thus, it makes sense
to think of the top as the highest officer on the ladder to whom the lawyer has
effective access. When the lawyer reaches this point without achieving a
resolution of the matter, the issue shifts from reporting up to reporting out.
As we have seen, old Rule 1.13 and Restatement section 96 speak of reporting
out as optional. Yet, both fiduciary principle and new Rule 1.13 suggest that
reporting-out is sometimes a duty. None of these norms provides any guidance as
to when the lawyer should report-out, other than an unhelpful invocation of the
“best interest of the client.”
46. Going public would often be appropriate where managers had failed to make an important mandated
public disclosure. For example, lawyers can appropriately force the managers to make public disclosures by
refusing to provide third-party opinions necessary to close a transaction, as they did in SEC v. Nat’l Student
Mktg., 430 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1977).
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There are three possible approaches to clarifying the matter: a categorical
prohibition, a categorical duty, and a contextual duty.
A. A CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION: ROUTINE DEFERENCE TO INCUMBENTS
This approach enjoins the lawyer to defer to senior agents. Once the lawyer
reaches the top of the ladder, she should go no further even where she believes
that further disclosure is in the interest of the organization.
California takes this approach in its version of Rule 1.13.47 Where either of the
Rule 1.13 conditions (illegality or likelihood of organizational harm) exist,
the rule says that the lawyer “may” take actions “in the best interest of the
organization” to prevent harm, but that in any event she “shall not” violate
confidentiality. I have suggested that confidentiality is not necessarily violated by
refusal to respect an agent’s unauthorized decision to assert it. However, the
California rule seems designed to override this point by adding that, when the
“highest authority” insists on illegal and harmful conduct, “the member’s
response is limited to” resigning.48 Rules providing that reporting out is governed
by the (largely irrelevant) confidentiality exceptions of Rule 1.6 seem similarly
restrictive.49
To the extent that these rules reflect an assumption that incumbent officers
speak for the client even when they are acting without authority, they involve the
Managerialist Fallacy. There is, however, a possible rationale for a non-
disclosure norm that does not depend on this fallacy. Forbidding outside
disclosure would make sense if (1) disclosure would sometimes be harmful to the
client, and (2) lawyers’ ability to identify the situations in which it would be
beneficial is so poor that on average the harmful effects of disclosure would
outweigh the good ones. Outside disclosure would be harmful where the lawyer
was wrong in his judgment that the relevant constituent conduct was unlawful or
where disclosure caused disruption or expense that were disproportionate to the
value of remedying the wrongdoing.
Yet, it would not seem plausible for the bar to portray lawyer judgments as
consistently poor. Organizational lawyers tend to market themselves as offering
reliable complex judgment in high-stakes situations. When professional responsi-
bility doctrine defines the core of professional expertise—for example, for
delimiting unauthorized practice prohibitions—it emphasizes the capacity for
complex judgment.50 Moreover, the duty of care to clients, as elaborated in
47. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3-600(A) (CAL. BAR ASS’N 1989).
48. Id.
49. See supra notes 33, 34.
50. See, e.g., In re First Escrow, 840 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Mo. 1992) (distinguishing “simple” legal judgment
permissible for lay providers from more complex forms requiring bar membership); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 72, illus. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (stating that whether lawyer’s preparation of
tax returns constitutes privileged legal advice depends on whether issues involved were “complex”).
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malpractice actions, typically presupposes that lawyers will make all-things-
considered judgments on behalf of their clients.
B. A CATEGORICAL DUTY: ROUTINE OUTSIDE DISCLOSURE
If on average the correct decision in hard cases would require outside
disclosure, it would be appropriate to enact a presumption in favor of disclosure,
as new Rule 1.13 does for cases that satisfy its conditions. If we distrusted
contextual lawyer judgments, we might make disclosure a categorical rule.
Mandated external reporting is rare, and when it appears, it is generally
intended to protect third parties. Key examples include the mandated reporting
under disciplinary rules in a few states to protect non-clients from “death or
substantial bodily injury,” and the requirement in a few states that attorneys
report information necessary to protect against child abuse.51
Perhaps the broadest instance of mandatory external reporting to protect the
organizational client is the statute requiring federal government lawyers to report
“[a]ny information . . . relating to violations of [the federal criminal code]
involving Government officers and employees” to the Attorney General.52 Such
reporting is external in a weak sense. It circumvents the chain of command. On
the other hand, it is not external in a strong sense because the client of the federal
government lawyer is sometimes considered to be “the relevant branch of
government.”53 Nevertheless, without the rule, these cases would be hard, since
there would be no clear reporting path beyond the agency head.
A mandatory external reporting norm has some advantages in common with a
mandatory internal reporting norm. A categorical norm undercuts the material
and cognitive pressures that are likely to bias the lawyer against reporting.
Moreover, while any reporting that jumps or circumvents the chain of command
will impair the lawyer’s relation with the officer with whom he has been dealing,
perhaps terminally, a mandatory norm may actually do less damage. The lawyer
can argue plausibly that he has no choice and that his report implies no personal
judgment about the officer.
However, some costs of a mandatory external reporting norm may be higher
than those of a mandatory internal norm. External intervention will usually be
more disruptive and costly. It will often entail harmful publicity. The intervention
will normally provide benefit to the organization only where it concludes that
agent conduct was improper or finds some ground for improving practice. If costs
51. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 21; Comment, Attorneys’ Duty to Report Child
Abuse, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 59, 72–73 (2004).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2012). The provision does not mention lawyers specifically but is generally
understood to apply to them. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
53. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1100; MODEL RULES R. 1.13, cmt. ¶ 7.
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are high and benefits low in a significantly large number of cases, the mandatory
rule may prove inefficient.
The bar would no doubt also worry about costs from diminished managerial
candor, but as elaborated below in Part VI, the incremental effect of enhanced
reporting requirements on managerial candor are unlikely to be great.
C. A CONTEXTUAL DUTY
As discussed, Rule 1.13 uses permissive language with respect to both inside
and outside reporting. To the extent that they apply to lawyers, state laws
protecting reporting of government wrongdoing also make reporting permissible.
These rules are potentially valuable shields against claims of breach of loyalty or
confidentiality, but they do not involve the kind of norm most commonly used to
define professional responsibilities to clients. The key norms that protect clients
typically involve duties to act in accordance with all relevant circumstances.
The common law duty of reasonable care is the paradigm. It is unimaginable
that a judge in a malpractice case would characterize as optional (that is, as
something the lawyer “may” do) a low-cost action that the lawyer believed was
necessary to protect the client’s legal interests from serious harm. But, neither
Rule 1.13 nor the state government reporting laws specify a duty to report out,
and they provide no guidance as to how decisions to report are to be exercised or
assessed.
There is sometimes reluctance to create duties for hard cases. One concern is
that duty implies liability, and it seems unfair to subject professionals to liability
for judgments in situations where people disagree about the right thing to do. But,
what makes a case hard is that it demands complex judgment, not necessarily that
people disagree. When competent professionals make the effort to analyze hard
cases, they often arrive at fairly consistent conclusions. Moreover, a liability
regime can take account of the degree of professional consensus on a matter in
deciding whether to sanction. Sometimes a good faith, procedurally adequate
effort is enough, even if it works out badly.54
If the idea that lawyers should have a duty to make a responsible contextual
judgment seems appealing, two sources of authority offer guidance as to how
such a duty might be defended and elaborated. Neither source directly addresses
the responsibilities of organizational counsel, but each is obliquely relevant and
offers an analytical clarity and coherence that is hard to find among more directly
pertinent authorities.
The first source is Garner,55 which, as previously noted, rejects the position
that management can categorically assert the corporation’s attorney-client
54. The “business judgment” rule for corporate managerial decisions is a good example. It limits liability for
decisions without modifying the underlying duty, and its protections depend on good faith effort.
55. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
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privilege against a derivative plaintiff and demands that control over the privilege
be decided by a contextual judgment about the organization’s best interests.
Garner is about judicial rather than lawyer decision-making. But, there is a
strong analogy to the situation of the lawyer considering whether to make
disclosures to constituents in situations of internal organizational dispute. The
standard the case ascribes to the judge is, in principle, the one that governs the
lawyer—the “best interest” of the organization. Garner recognizes that to defer
to management routinely would involve either the Managerialist Fallacy or the
assumption that management, conflicted as it is, is the most plausible guardian of
organizational interests.56 The doctrine responds by prescribing contextual
judgment. It makes this judgment a duty, and it prescribes plausible standards to
guide it.
In the situation specifically addressed by Garner, the professional responsibil-
ity issue for the lawyer is usually moot. The court will usually be in a good
position to make a judgment to protect the client. But, there are other situations
where constituents cannot put the matter before a judge because they lack
information needed to identify the issue and bring a claim. In these situations, the
lawyer could use the Garner factors to structure her decision whether to disclose
to the constituents or to some outsider charged with protecting them, such as the
SEC or the Attorney General.
The other pertinent source of authority for contextual judgment on outside
disclosure is Rule 1.14, which addresses a lawyer’s duties with regard to a “client
with diminished capacity.” The rule was not enacted with organizational clients
in mind, and it is unlikely to be applied to them. Nevertheless, both its language
and its logic are applicable to the organizational context.57
Rule 1.14 says that when a client is at risk of harm “unless some action is
taken” and the client because of “diminished capacity” cannot act in his own
interest, “the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action.” It says
further that such action may include “consulting with individuals or entities that
have the ability to protect the client.”
This language literally describes the problematic organizational situation. Of
course, in the organizational situation, diminished capacity arises not from
physical or psychiatric impairment but from the bad faith or conflicted interests
of those with presumptive decision-making authority. However, the effect of the
two types of impairment is similar—an inability to make reliable self-protective
decisions. And, there is no reason to think the lawyer is any less able to identify
one type of impairment than another. In this situation, Rule 1.14 suggests that
56. Id.
57. See George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm
to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 637
(2003) (noting the analogy between an organizational client incapacitated by agent misconduct and a disabled
individual client).
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added responsibility falls to the lawyer to take protective action. Although Rule
1.14 resembles Rule 1.13 in its debatable permissive language, it is remarkably
different in its absence of arbitrary qualifications. The lawyer is clearly able to
make any disclosures necessary to protect the client.
One way to look at Rule 1.14 is as a specific application of a more general
principle giving the lawyer implied authority to make disclosures of otherwise
confidential information necessary to protect the client’s interests. Restatement
Section 61 says, “A lawyer may disclose client information when the lawyer
reasonably believes that doing so will advance the interests of the client in the
representation.” And, Rule 1.6 exempts from confidentiality restrictions “disclo-
sure[s] impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.”
These rules do not create duties. Rather, they are designed to align the
confidentiality norms with the duty of care expressed in Rule 1.1 (requiring
“competent” representation) and the common law. They preclude confidentiality
objections when client interests require disclosure. Thus, they seem highly
pertinent to cases like Ossias’s where the lawyer takes initiative to disclose to
protect client interests. Yet, they were not mentioned in the Ossias discussion and
are generally ignored in discussions of reporting out. Why?
The Managerialist Fallacy may be at work here. With unimpaired individuals,
the client can define her own interests, and implied authority rests on assumptions
about what the individual would instruct in situations where it is not practical to
consult her. Where we know that the individual client would instruct us not to
disclose, we cannot think of the lawyer as disclosing in the client’s interests,
unless she is impaired. There is a tendency to analogize organizational to
individual clients by assuming that when we know that senior managers would
oppose disclosure, disclosure cannot be seen as in the client’s interests. But of
course, the presumed or expressed views of the managers count as evidence of
client interest only if the agents are authorized to speak for the organization,
which in our scenario they are not. Organizations do not suffer physical or mental
disabilities. But, the condition in which agent ignorance or irresponsibility leaves
the organization without legitimate direction is a disability to which organiza-
tions are distinctively prone. It makes sense in this situation to give lawyers the
kind of discretion contemplated by Rule 1.14 and the more general rules on
implied authority.
A second reason why we may not think of the Ossias case in terms of implied
authority is our tendency to assume that commission weighs more heavily in a
moral calculus than omission. So, we fret over whether Ossias had authority to
disclose, while taking it for granted that she had authority to remain silent. This
distinction would make sense in a case involving responsibility to people with
whom the actor had no special relation. The distinction, though, is foreign to the
fiduciary idea, which charges the duty holder with proactive responsibility, not
just with avoiding harm.
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IV. HARD CASES: BOUNDARY PROBLEMS
It is sometimes ambiguous whether activity is occurring inside or outside of
the organizational client. A corporate manager’s materially incomplete disclosure
to shareholders, though not actionable as fraud, might be a breach of fiduciary
duty if the shareholders were considered part of the corporate entity. Cindy
Ossias’s report to a legislative oversight committee might not have implicated
client confidentiality if, as some defenders argued, her client was the state of
California. We can consider these situations as illustrations of problems that arise
from the indeterminacy of organizational boundaries. Sometimes defining the
lawyer’s duties requires clarifying ambiguities of substantive law. Conversely,
sometimes the substantive law draws lines that do not take account of the
practical stakes in professional responsibility questions, and effective resolution
requires disregarding formal boundaries.
A. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS
In surveys, large fractions of public company executives say they engage in
both accounting techniques and “real” activities manipulation in order to produce
earnings reports that “meet or beat” analyst estimates or the firm’s own
predictions.58 “Real” activities manipulations include deferring research or
capital expenditures, timing the sale of assets, or cutting prices of goods already
produced in order to boost sales prior to the close of an accounting period.
Managers acknowledge that these tactics often “sacrifice economic value.”59
Managers engage in earnings management because they think that it will
support or raise the stock price. As a technical matter their judgments on such
matters would seem entitled to deference. But there is concern that they have a
bias because their compensation and their tenure tend to depend strongly on
short-term prices. Moreover, the benefits to managers of even long-term positive
price effects might not be widely shared if they resulted from sustained deception
that caused a misallocation of capital to the corporation. Managers are
disproportionately invested in the corporation, whereas the typical shareholder is
diversified. If the corporation succeeds by diverting capital from more productive
enterprises, diversified shareholders may suffer net losses from the deception.
In order to simplify a complex matter, let us assume (plausibly, I believe) that
accounting rules often give managers substantial discretion with respect to
financial reporting. Managers can exercise this discretion in ways that influence
stock price, at least in the short term. However, tactics that raise stock prices
frequently depart from the managers’ judgments as to what presentation would
58. John Graham, Campbell R. Harve, & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate
Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & FIN. 3, 40 (Dec. 2005).
59. Id.
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most informatively portray the company’s economic condition. The managers
would prefer that such tactics not be used by advisors preparing reports on which
they themselves rely. Should the managers feel obliged or permitted to adopt the
tactics that maximize short-term share price, or should they feel obliged to use
those they regard as most informative?
From the point of view of the lawyer advising the manager on his
responsibilities or assessing the manager’s compliance with them, the question
would turn on whether a manager’s preference for aggressive reporting is
consistent with the interests of the client. Lawyers properly defer to managerial
and auditor judgments on some accounting matters, but they have a responsibility
to induce compliance with legal disclosure norms that cabin managerial
discretion and sometimes trump auditor judgment.60
It would seem relevant to these issues whether the beneficiaries of corporate
disclosure duties are considered in fiduciary terms.61 The practices in question do
not satisfy the fiduciary norm of “utmost candor” or the requirement that the
fiduciary deal with the beneficiary “as he would deal with himself.”62 Yet, if the
addressees of financial reporting are strangers entitled only to ordinary duties,
then managers have more limited responsibility to protect them from foreseeably
misleading but not literally false disclosure.
Relevant substantive law is inconsistent. On the one hand, fiduciary themes are
salient in modern corporate doctrine on share repurchases and reorganizations
and on insider trading. In these cases, insiders make use of corporate information
to benefit themselves at the expense of other shareholders. Older doctrine tended
to reject liability where the conduct did not involve misrepresentation and the
only harm was to the entity’s distributive norms.63 Modern cases tend to
repudiate such views as manifestations of the Collectivist Fallacy.64
This tendency might support a fiduciary approach to disclosure more generally.
Under such a view, managers should exercise discretion to maximize transpar-
ency rather than reported earnings. Departures from transparency should be
justified by some specific, articulated non-paternalistic and generalizable share-
holder interest (for example, a need to keep information from non-shareholder
constituencies, such as competitors). The demand for a non-accounting business
purpose for practices that influence financial reports would seem to follow.
60. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that compliance with accounting
standards does not establish that financial statements meet securities act prohibitions of misleading statements).
61. It is unimportant whether we characterize disclosure duties as duties to the entity or to the constituents.
The key question is whether the duties to the entity require fiduciary-type disclosure to constituents.
62. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 838 (Posner, J.).
63. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879,
915–23 (1988); A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law
of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13 (1998).
64. DeMott, supra note 63, at 915–23; Pritchard, supra note 63, at 13.
2016] DUTIES TO ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS 511
Adopting this view would add some clarity to existing doctrine and would
probably condemn at least some common practices.65
Yet, managers and lawyers often speak as if their relation to the recipients of
financial disclosure was arm’s length. John Coffee, explaining the bar’s
resistance to responsibility for the integrity of financial reporting, writes, “Law
firms . . . remain in their own minds the zealous champions of their clients, not
gatekeepers.”66 This may be simply the Managerialist Fallacy—identifying the
client with management. If not, then it assumes that the client entity has some
interests in tension with optimal disclosure. But, Coffee does not consider what
those interests might be.67 To take a more dramatic example, the Fifth Circuit
reversed a conviction for “theft of honest services” under the Mail and Wire
Fraud statutes based on blatantly fraudulent securities reporting because it found
that managers had not been disloyal to the corporation (deeming disloyalty an
element of the offense).68 “We do not presume that it is in a corporation’s
legitimate interests ever to misstate earnings—it is not,” the court wrote.69 But, it
then went on to presume that the defendants could have non-recklessly believed
as much.70 Aside from insider trading, disclosure doctrine does not consistently
adopt fiduciary terms. It remains unclear to what extent practices involving
strategic silence, half-truths, and evasiveness that would not be permissible under
65. See Steven E. Bochner & Douglas J. Clark, Securities Disclosure: When is Managing to a Forecast
Illegal Earnings Management?, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, Nov. 2008, at 165 (noting ambiguity with respect to the permissibility of earnings management). One
implication of the fiduciary perspective is that, where accounting rules give managers discretion as to how to
present data, they should be able to explain to auditors how they have exercised that discretion in the interests of
shareholders. However, as things now stand, auditors are largely concerned with “consistency” rather than
“preferability.” JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 129–30
(2006).
66. Id. at 369. See also the letter from virtually every large firm in New York protesting a proposed SEC rule
that would have required lawyers to withdraw when management insisted on illegal courses of conduct and to
report that they withdrew for professional reasons (“noisy withdrawal”). The firms argued that such a proposal
would “drive a wedge between client and the counsel who advised it on a matter.” Letter from 77 Law Firms to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77lawfirms1.
htm [https://perma.cc/UG8C-5MJ4] (emphasis added).
67. In a rare discussion of the issue, Steven Schwarcz tries to square soft deception and fiduciary duties by
saying that duties should further the interests of current shareholders rather than future ones. Since current
shareholders are prospective sellers, they benefit from soft deception if it raises prices. Steven Schwarcz,
Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044
(2005). However for at least some purposes, securities doctrine takes a very different approach: (1) insider
trading doctrine explicitly based on fiduciary norms extends relief to deceived buyers even though they are not
shareholders before the purchase is concluded; (2) disclosure norms have sometimes been elaborated with
respect to a hypothetical “reasonable” shareholder so that perverse or idiosyncratic interests of actual
shareholders can be ignored. TSC Industries v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
68. United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006).
69. Id. at 522.
70. Id.
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fiduciary norms are allowed under the securities laws.71
When the substantive law relevant to the client is ambiguous, it is difficult for
the lawyer to assess the authority of those who purport to speak for the client. In
this situation, default to managerial deference seems inevitable, but this is not a
principled solution where the norms in question are intended to cabin managerial
discretion.
Such problems call for doctrinal clarification. It seems unlikely that the bar
could achieve this alone, and it is debatable whether the bar has anything at all to
contribute. The Sarbanes-Oxley rules show that murky evasiveness of Rule 1.13
is not inevitable. For the most part, the Sarbanes-Oxley rules are clear and
coherent. Nonetheless, they were enacted without much help, and over some
opposition, from the bar.72
Arguably a more pertinent, and perhaps more inspiring, example is the recent
tax compliance regime of the Internal Revenue Service, especially the part
designed to inhibit tax shelters.73 The regulations provide a good deal of clarity
with respect to both substantive requirements and lawyer practices to induce
compliance. A norm that is especially pertinent to financial reporting is the
treatment of “business purpose” in the tax regime. The recent regime elaborates a
long-standing doctrine that transactions that lack a non-tax business purpose are
presumptively disregarded in calculating tax liability. Lawyers have a duty to
insist that managers provide a non-frivolous explanation of such a purpose before
providing certain kinds of assistance with relevant transactions.74 Such a
“business purpose” norm would seem equally appropriate in the securities
sphere. It would mandate disregard of the accounting effects of practices that
lacked a non-accounting business purpose (or more modestly, separate disclosure
of all practices affecting reported figures that were motivated by accounting
goals).75 Yet, such a norm has not been elaborated as clearly or generally in the
securities area as in tax. The tax regime is largely a matter of administrative
regulation, but the bar played an important role in its development. To an
important extent, the regulations codify principles enunciated by the tax sections
of the American Bar Association (ABA) and the New York State Bar and by the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility.76
71. Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1639 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others,
52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999).
72. Clifton Barnes, ABA, States, and SEC Hash Out Lawyers’ Responsibility in Corporate Settings, BAR
LEADER (Nov./Dec. 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/2003_04/2802/corporate.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5X4-8HJP].
73. MICHAEL GRAETZ & DEBORAH SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 790–823 (6th ed. 2009); Tanina Rostain,
Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77–120 (2006).
74. E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 239 U.S. 465 (1935).
75. Bochner & Clark, supra note 65 propose a requirement that all practices undertaken for earnings
management purposes be identified in the Management Discussion & Analysis section of the report.
76. See Dennis Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2008).
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Such a collaborative initiative would be the best way to clarify lawyer
responsibilities with respect to financial reporting norms.
B. GOVERNMENT CLIENT ISSUES
The Managerialist Fallacy operates in the public sector as well as the private.
However, the public sector seems uniquely susceptible to an opposed tendency in
which the client is defined so generally and abstractly that practical interests are
obscured. Rule 1.13’s comment states, “Although the [government lawyer’s]
client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as
the executive branch, or the government as a whole.”77 Such grandiose
conceptions of the client are encouraged by customary practices in which lawyers
appear on behalf of the “United States” or the “State of Iowa” or the “People” of
California, implying that the represent the entire nation or state. Such rhetoric is
useful to the extent that it undermines the tendency to identify the client with
managers, but it can be troublesome. We can see this by considering issues that
arise, first, about authority to instruct the lawyer, and second, about the scope of
confidentiality and conflicts protection.
1. AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THE GOVERNMENT CLIENT
Geoffrey Miller emphasized the danger that lawyer judgments based on
contested and ambiguous conceptions of the client as the public interest or the
government as a whole might become undisciplined and unaccountable. Thus,
Miller invokes the principle we have emphasized that the lawyer should look to
the allocation of authority within the broader institutional structure.
Miller’s main example concerns a hypothetical lawyer in the Department of
Education asked by the Secretary to defend a school aid program that includes
parochial schools. The lawyer believes to a high degree of confidence that the
statute is unconstitutional but there are non-frivolous arguments that can be made
in defense of the program. The lawyer should proceed to advance the Secretary’s
position despite his own view of the merits. The Secretary, Miller assumes, has
the authority to decide the position that the executive branch will take. The
Constitution contemplates that the dispute will ultimately be worked out through
the interaction of the three branches. For the lawyer to block the defense of the
program would short-circuit this process.
Miller’s conclusion about the education case is plausible.78 But his analysis
has three critical limitations. First, in some cases, the authority structure will lead
back to the lawyer herself. Government lawyers are sometimes charged with
77. MODEL RULES R. 1.13, cmt. ¶ 9.
78. But the position is not beyond debate. A complex analysis of “constitutional nondefense” has emerged in
recent years that sometimes reaches different conclusions. Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the
States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2014).
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making decisions on behalf of the client in terms of public-interest standards.
This is true generally of prosecutors in criminal cases. In addition, the federal
Solicitor General and many state attorneys general have such authority with
respect to initiation and defense on behalf of the government of civil claims.79 At
best, Miller’s argument applies to situations where neither enacted authority nor
custom give lawyers this kind of autonomy. Second, Miller focuses on the
relatively easy case where an official has clear authority. Third, the separation-of-
powers principle proves much less helpful than Miller suggests. The second and
third limitations are demonstrated by the Ossias case.
In Miller’s scenario, because the manager has a plausible claim of authority
and all relevant activity is occurring in public, there is no tension between the
agent’s instructions to the lawyer and the lawyer’s duty to the institutional client.
The Ossias case was different. Recall that Ossias, a staff lawyer in the California
Department of Insurance, discovered that the Commissioner of Insurance had
negotiated settlements with penalties much more lenient than staff had recom-
mended in return for agreement by the insurance companies to make contribu-
tions to nongovernmental organizations controlled by the Commissioner. The
organizations were ostensibly devoted to the public interest but in practice
focused on promoting the Commissioner’s career. When a member of a Senate
oversight committee asked about the matter, Ossias provided him with informa-
tion about the settlements. The Commissioner fired Ossias, claiming she had
breached her duty of confidentiality. However, the Commissioner himself
resigned under pressure when the facts became public, and his successor re-hired
Ossias.
Although both the state Attorney General and the State Bar disciplinary
counsel opined on the case, they addressed the matter in question-begging ways.
The Attorney General opined only as to whether one or more of the state
whistle-blower protection laws superseded the attorney’s duty of confidentiality.
The Attorney General concluded that the statutes did not affect confidentiality,
reasoning that the legislature would not have altered a well-established norm
without more explicit indication than these statutes contained.80 The State Bar
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel explained its decision not to seek discipline
against Ossias by saying that her conduct was “consistent with the spirit” of the
statutes and “advanced important public policy considerations.”81 The letter left
ambiguous whether the Office considered the conduct justified or merely
excused, and gave no general guidance about the circumstances in which
disclosure is appropriate.
We have already pointed out in connection with derivative suits that the
question of an exception arises only after it has been decided that loyalty to the
79. See text accompanying supra notes 17-18.
80. OFF. OF THE CAL. ATT’Y GEN., Opinion No. 00-1203 (May 23, 2001).
81. Reprinted in ZITRIN ET AL., supra note 3.
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client requires silence. The incumbent Commissioner cannot speak with author-
ity for the client in this situation. If Ossias had superiors within the agency who
were not conflicted, it might have been appropriate to defer to them. If not, then it
fell to Ossias herself to decide whether the interests of the client required
disclosure and to whom. As a fiduciary, Ossias could not use the lack of
instruction from the client as a reason to default to silence. She had an affirmative
duty to take action to protect the client.
No part of the analysis depends on whether we characterize the client as the
Department of Insurance, the executive branch, or the state of California. For any
of these characterizations, the Commissioner would have had authority in some
circumstances to instruct the attorney not to communicate with state officers
outside the department. And, for any of these characterizations, under the
circumstances of the actual case, the Commissioner lacked authority to instruct
her. Ossias thus had responsibility for making her own assessment of the client’s
interests, and the most plausible assessment suggests disclosure.
Nor does the characterization of the client tell us much about to whom
disclosure should be made. The most plausible candidates would appear to be the
Attorney General and the legislative oversight committee. The state Constitution
makes the Attorney General “the chief law enforcement officer of the state” with
the duty “to see that laws shall be uniformly and adequately enforced.”82 The
legislature has oversight responsibilities, which one of its committees was
actively asserting at the time. The key question is which official seems most
likely to respond effectively to protect the relevant client interests. We do not
know enough to make a confident choice, although the fact that the legislative
committee was already engaged weighed in favor of it. As presently informed, we
have no reason to question Ossias’s decision. Whether the disclosure is deemed
within or outside the client organization is at most one factor in this determination.
2. PRIVILEGE AND CONFLICTS ISSUES
Boundary concerns are sometimes invoked in attorney-client privilege and
conflicts cases. Privilege will be available only if the communication in question
was made by someone speaking on behalf of the client and was made in
confidence, meaning not in the presence of someone outside the attorney-client
relationship.83 Thus, privilege issues sometimes appear to turn on whether some
participant was an unauthorized agent or an outsider. Such issues are often raised
in conflicts disputes, since conflicts doctrine is heavily driven by confidentiality
concerns.
Generally, courts at least start with formal legal boundaries. In the private
sector, affiliated businesses are usually treated as independent for confidentiality
82. California Constitution, Art. V, §13.
83. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §§ 68, 70 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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and conflicts purposes. A lawyer for a parent corporation is not per se disqualified
from a representation adverse to a subsidiary.84 By the same logic, the client’s
disclosure of privileged information to agents of a subsidiary would waive the
privilege (absent a common interest agreement).
But courts often disregard formal boundaries when the relevant practical
contingencies seem out of alignment with them. Where formally separate
organizations have common management and integrated operations, courts will
disregard the corporate form for conflicts purposes, much as they do for liability
purposes.85 Information provided in confidence by a client affiliate for the benefit
of the client may be privileged even where the affiliate is not a client agent.86 In a
suit between parties to the sale of a corporation, former managers who negotiated
the sale may be able to assert the corporation’s attorney-client privilege against
the survivor even where substantive law treats the survivor as equivalent to the
original entity. The interests of the selling and current constituents (and those of
the formerly separate entities for which they acted) were opposed at the time of
the negotiation; so, if the selling managers are to be provided meaningful
confidentiality, the buyer cannot be allowed to inherit control over their
communications.87
In the public sector, relying on formal boundaries is more difficult because the
boundaries are more ambiguous and broader to begin with. It seems a clumsy
response to confidentiality and conflicts issues to say that the client is the
executive branch, much less the entire federal or state government. Two appeals
court cases arising from the Whitewater investigation gesture in that direction.
They held that the President and the First Lady could not assert privilege against
federal grand jury subpoenas. Although both courts gave multiple reasons for the
holding, both seemed influenced by the fact that these were “dispute[s] within the
federal government.”88 Each opinion suggested that privilege would be available
84. Reuben Donnelly v. Sprint Publ’g & Advert., Inc., No. 95 C. 5825, 1996 WL 99902 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29,
1996), at *2–3 (holding that Jones Day, by representing one subsidiary, does not thereby have conflict in
representation adverse to separate subsidiary; court notes that parent has more than 250 affiliated corporations).
85. Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Gerling Glob. Reins. Corp., No. 99 CIV. 4413 (LLM), 2000 WL 1159260, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2000) (client and affiliate were in same business, had same senior officers, shared common
offices, payroll and HR departments, computer systems, travel agents, credit card issuers, and employee
gatherings).
86. See Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th Cir. 1978) (disqualifying
counsel from representation adverse to constituents of former client where constituents provided material
information to counsel to assist former representation).
87. Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.F.2d 663, 671–72 (N.Y. 1996); Int’l Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer,
527 F.2d 1288, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975). This case plausibly distinguishes confidences concerning matters as to
which sellers’ and buyers’ interests were adverse at the time of the acquisition from confidences concerning the
acquired corporation’s conflicts with third parties, as to which seller and buyer may be assumed to have
common interests. The case holds that the acquiring corporation does inherit control over the latter type of
confidence.
88. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d
1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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against a non-federal litigant. Thus, they implied that the relevant disclosure was
internal to the larger government client. In this sense, the cases resembled
derivative suits, in which all parties in interest purport to represent the client
interests.
However, any broad use of the whole-government-as-client idea would
disrespect the reality of division and diversity within administrative government.
Many government offices are designed to act independently of and sometimes
even adversely to other offices. In such situations, there is often an argument for
an approach that defines the client more narrowly for confidentiality or conflicts
purposes. Some cases take such an approach. Instead of trying to reason to a
conclusion from a formal definition of the client, they assess the unit’s practical
need for confidentiality. In litigation between different constituents of the same
government, the courts will sometimes examine constitutive law to see how
much decisional autonomy the constituents have. Where the court finds a
substantial amount, it may treat them as separate for confidentiality or conflicts
purposes.
For example, in Civil Service Commission v. Superior Court,89 the issue was
whether the County Counsel was disqualified from representing the County in an
action against the Civil Service Commission, a county agency. The lawyer had
previously advised the Commission on related matters, so the Commission
claimed it was a former client entitled to disqualify the lawyer from a current
adverse representation. The lawyer responded that his client had always been the
County even when he advised a constituent agency, and hence the Commission
was not a separate former client. The court disqualified the lawyer. It held that,
while “normally” the county as a whole is deemed to be the client, in this case the
practical circumstances of autonomy of the Commission warranted treating the
Commission as a separate entity for conflicts purposes.
V. THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF STRONG CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION FOR
ORGANIZATIONS
The legal profession’s confidentiality norms are harder to justify with respect
to organizations than with respect to individual clients. The case for strong
confidentiality norms—norms that preclude disclosures necessary to prevent
serious injustice or underserved harm—is fragile in any context, but it is
especially weak with organizational clients.90
89. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Sup. Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). For discussion of this and
related cases, see Clark, supra note 19, at 1056–62.
90. See William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the
Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1460 (2006); William H. Simon, Managerial Confidentiality Is
Overrated, N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 2, 2003). “Strong confidentiality” can be contrasted to moderate confidentiality,
which forbids disclosure of client information where not necessary to prevent injustice or undeserved harm. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05, cmt c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating that an agent’s duty “not to
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The general argument for confidentiality rests on two propositions. First,
confidentiality induces client disclosures that are necessary for well-informed
legal advice—the disclosure premise. And second, well-informed legal advice
induces socially desirable behavior—the channeling premise.
So stated, the argument is incomplete. The fact that confidentiality has some
socially desirable effects does not establish its value. The key issue is its net
effects—whether the desirable effects of increased disclosure to lawyers
outweigh the undesirable ones of decreased disclosure by lawyers. We have
virtually no evidence on the matter, and the proposition that net effects are
positive is not strong as a matter of intuition. It is a mystery how the channeling
function allegedly enabled by strong confidentiality works. A client who is
independently motivated to obey the law does not need confidentiality to induce
full disclosure to the lawyer. So, the channeling argument depends on clients who
have some propensity to disrespect the law. What does the lawyer say to such a
client that induces respect? Telling her of the penalty will tend to induce respect
only if it exceeds what she expected; if it is lower, it will tend to induce
disrespect. If there are costs other than legal penalties that the client has failed to
consider (for example, reputational or relational costs), the lawyer may be able to
deter a lawless course of action by drawing attention to them. Yet, again, the
candid lawyer will have to advise the client when he has over-estimated such
costs as well as when he has under-estimated them, and the former advice will
tend to induce disrespect. At this point, the lawyer is free to bring up ethical and
prudential considerations, but there is no reason to think that this discourse, for
which the lawyer has no special training and for which he will often be
unrewarded, will be effective.91
For present purposes, the more important problem concerns the disclosure
premise—the proposition that confidentiality is necessary to induce the client to
fully inform the lawyer. Whatever the case with respect to individuals,
use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third
party” is “not absolute” and that “[a]n agent may reveal otherwise privileged information to protect a superior
interest of the agent or a third party”). Of course, confidentiality under the legal profession’s norms is not as
strong as it was in the past, but there are still many situations where the norms mandate silence in the face of
serious harm or injustice. See, e.g., State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978) (refusing to find grounds for
disclosure of a deceased client’s secrets even where it might be necessary to vindicate a wrongly convicted
person).
91. Of course, many lawyers disclaim the channeling idea even as a matter of aspiration, as the quotation
from the Vinson & Elkins partner shows. Waldmeir, supra note 2. While the channeling or “gatekeeping” role
comes up routinely in defenses of privilege, it is more often than not resisted in other contexts. Moreover, some
suggest that any version of this function going beyond appeals to informed self-interest would be overwhelmed
by economic trends (increasing competition and the tendency of outside counsel engagements to be short-term)
and psychological forces (the tendency of lawyers to identify with the managers who instruct and retain them).
See Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer: A Brief Informal History of a Myth With Some Basis in Reality, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1195–96 (2009) (noting lawyer resistance to channeling duties); Sung Hui Kim,
Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 131–32 (2011)
(same).
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organizations are different in two fundamental respects. First, as previously
noted, control of the privilege in the organizational context usually resides with
agents different from the ones who make the communications. This means that
the lawyer cannot assure the agent that confidentiality will protect her from
adverse consequences from her communications. The lawyer may have to
disclose material facts she learns from the agent within the organization no matter
how harmful those disclosures are to the agent. And, the organization can waive
confidentiality and disclose the agent’s communications to outsiders, like law
enforcement officials, no matter how harmful the disclosure is to the agent. Even
top-level agents cannot be confident their communications will not harm them.
Conflict of interest may disqualify them from making decisions about whether to
waive privilege with respect to their own statements. If the board turns over or the
company goes into bankruptcy, a successor board or bankruptcy trustee may
decide to waive.92 And we have seen that a shareholder plaintiff can often
overcome the board’s assertion of privilege.
Second, organizations are enmeshed in mandatory disclosure regimes, such as
civil litigation discovery or reporting requirements of the securities, environmen-
tal, or health and safety laws. Confidentiality has little effect on duties under such
regimes. When the lawyer learns of information that must be disclosed in a
confidential communication from an agent of the client, confidentiality may
protect the communication, but it typically will not protect the underlying
information.93 If the lawyer has responsibility for the client’s compliance with
disclosure duties, she will have to insist on disclosure of the information no
matter how disadvantageous disclosure is to the client.
Therefore, confidentiality is unlikely to motivate much disclosure to lawyers
that would not have been made in its absence. However, since at least Upjohn v.
United States,94 there has been a second argument in favor of confidentiality in
the organizational context —inducing senior managers to monitor the conduct of
their subordinates. Managers will not monitor, the argument goes, if the
information they collect is discoverable by regulators, prosecutors, and plaintiffs’
lawyers. The argument does not depend on the more general justification of
inducing agent communications. Even if confidentiality does not enhance agents’
willingness to communicate, agents will still provide information that does not
reflect badly on them, such as information about other agents’ wrongdoing.
Without the assurance of confidentiality, Upjohn reasoned, senior managers
might not seek such information, and the quality of legal advice and corporate
governance would suffer.
92. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69, cmt. par. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
94. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 391 (1981).
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Viewed in isolation and in the abstract, the Upjohn argument carries some
weight, and, when the case was decided in 1981, it may have had some practical
effect in encouraging monitoring. However, the Upjohn rationale quickly became
obsolete. Developments in substantive law have made it unlikely that senior
managers would fail to make reasonable monitoring efforts regardless of
confidentiality protections.
In various cases decided since Upjohn, the Delaware courts have emphasized
that fiduciary duties require managers to seek out relevant professional advice
and to proactively monitor the conduct of subordinates. Notably, the courts
repudiated earlier statements suggesting that managers had broad discretion with
respect to monitoring and emphasized the duty to institute compliance processes
and to follow up “red flags” suggesting misconduct.95 The cases also indicated
that the protections of the business judgment rule would not be available where
managers failed to make reasonable efforts to acquire information relevant to
their decisions, including relevant professional advice.96 In addition, in 1991 the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Commission promulgated guidelines for the
sentencing of organizations convicted of crimes. These guidelines provide as a
mitigating factor that the crime occurred despite “an effective ethics and
compliance program.”97 These and other initiatives98 have fostered a managerial
pre-occupation with compliance, monitoring, and investigation. Given the
powerful incentives they create, it is highly unlikely that the inducements of
Upjohn play an important role.99
The objections to strong confidentiality are even weightier with government
organizations because mandatory disclosure regimes are even more extensive in
that context. Statutes give broad public access to government information with
only narrowly defined exceptions. The federal statute requiring the reporting of
illegal conduct to the Attorney General has been interpreted to apply to lawyers,
and some federal and state whistleblower protection statutes include lawyers. In
addition, there have been trends in the public sector similar to those that have
induced greater monitoring in private organizations. For example, under the
Government Performance and Results Act, federal agencies are obliged to make
periodic plans that include active monitoring measures. Additionally, more than
95. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367–70 (Del. 2006).
96. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867–68, 876–77 (Del. 1985) (emphasizing the duty to seek relevant
professional advice). Note that while corporate charters commonly purport to exempt directors from
duty-of-care liability, monitoring is considered an element of the requirement of “good faith”, which cannot be
waived. DEL. CORP. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015); Stone, 911 A.2d at 368–70.
97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
98. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012), which requires public company
senior managers to attest individually to the accuracy of financial reports and auditors to certify the
effectiveness of “internal controls.”
99. Andrew Higgins makes a similar argument with respect to the English privilege on the basis of
developments in British company and regulatory law. Andrew Higgins, Legal Advice Privilege and Its
Relevance to Corporations, 73 MOD. L. REV. 371, 383–88 (2010).
2016] DUTIES TO ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS 521
70 federal agencies have inspector generals who engage in monitoring full time.
There should be no more concern in the public than in the private sector that
confidentiality is necessary to motivate supervision.100
The main cost of strong confidentiality is to preclude lawyer disclosures that
would prevent or mitigate harm to third parties by the client. (Strong confidenti-
ality does not prevent disclosures to protect the client). However, it is possible
that strong confidentiality has two sorts of indirect costs to organizational clients.
First, the main effect of Upjohn was to give lawyers a monopoly over corporate
investigations by enabling them to promise more confidentiality than competing
professions.101 This result could be harmful to clients if lawyers are not the
professionals best equipped to run investigations. Confidentiality aside, there is
no reason to think lawyers are distinctively equipped for this role. The relevant
skills are not taught in law schools or tested on the bar. Accountants or engineers
are more likely to have received relevant training for some investigations.
Second, it is possible that strong confidentiality inhibits the exchange of
information within the organization in ways that compromise core management
functions. Upjohn limits privilege in ambiguous and non-intuitive ways that
create vague risks that internal communications will result in waiver. For
example, communications may lose privilege under Upjohn if they are not made
“in order to secure legal advice” and “at the direction of corporate superiors.”102
Even under more protective standards than Upjohn, the privilege can be lost if the
communication involves agents that a court decides did not “need to know.”103
Lawyers are inclined to advise against internal communications that risk loss of
privilege.104 The resulting inhibitions may compromise discussion of such
matters as product defects or risky business practices. The General Motors Cobalt
100. Clark, supra note 19, at 1035; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-38, RESULTS-
ORIENTED GOVERNMENT: GPRA HAS ESTABLISHED A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING BETTER RESULTS (2004);
Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights From Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1027 (2012).
101. See LAWRENCE FOX ET AL., THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING ORGANIZATIONS 112 (2009) (“[W]hen [a
catastrophe] occurs, any investigation into the cause and how the organization should respond is best conducted
under the direction and control of counsel so the . . . the results themselves are protected from having to be
shared with those who do not have the organization’s best interests at heart.”).
102. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 394 (1981).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(4) cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
104. See, e.g., FOX ET AL., supra note 100, at 112–14 (2009) (advising that in an investigation
communications with counsel “should be shared, if at all, only with those who have a need to know” and that
employees should discuss such communications among themselves only “with the permission of counsel”);
Jennifer Chunias & Roberto M. Braceras, Conducting Effective Internal Investigations: A Corporate Counsel
Guide, MCLE (Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston) (Jan. 2015) (advising investigating counsel “not to record
interviews,” to “minimize the presence of observers” at interviews, and to “[t]hink twice about addressing
sensitive topics with employees”).
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airbag non-deployment case may be an example.105 GM did not act for nearly 10
years to remedy a major life-threatening defect in large part because of failures of
information exchange within the organization. Lawyers controlled some of the
relevant information because it related to pending lawsuits. Engineers trying to
figure out the problem did not ask for the information because they believed
(wrongly according to the lawyers) that privileged information was not available
to them.106
Even more troubling is the occasional practice of advising boards not to ask for
a written report of an investigation because the government or a plaintiffs’ lawyer
may be able to discover and make use of it.107 The absence of a written report on
a matter of any complexity has a high probability of lowering the quality of
analysis and discussion. There is some irony here. The whole rationale of Upjohn
confidentiality is to encourage investigation. Even if this effect were substantial,
it would be vitiated if efforts to preserve confidentiality impeded thoughtful
consideration of the results of the investigation.
Of course, a client aware of the costs of protecting confidentiality can make its
own decision about how to trade it off with competing values. However, concern
arises from the fact that lawyers have economic interests and cultural predisposi-
tions that may lead them to exaggerate the value of confidentiality and thus bias
the client’s consideration.108
CONCLUSION
Lawyers know that, in principle, an organizational client is not identical to its
managers. But, they often seem unclear about how to understand and assist with
the client other than by deferring to the managers who retain and address the
lawyers. Recognizing that the organization is a structure of decision rules,
fiduciary duties, and property rules is essential to sound analysis. It follows that
professional duties will turn strongly on substantive law issues and often require
105. Anton R. Valukas, Report to Board of Directors of General Motors Company Regarding Ignition Switch
Recalls (May 29, 2014), http://www.beasleyallen.com/webfiles/valukas-report-on-gm-redacted.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7NXF-CU62].
106. Id. In the course of the Valukas investigation, the in-house lawyers said that, if the engineers had asked,
they would have provided the information.
107. I am aware from informal conversations of several complex cases in which counsel advised against
written reports. General published advice is often neutral on the question of writing but warns that “[t]here are a
number of problems associated with reducing a report to writing.” Daniel S. Reinberg, Conducting Internal
Investigations, Foley & Lardner LLP, at 17.
108. See, e.g., FOX ET AL., supra note 100, at 113 (“Everyone within the organization who communicates
with the organization’s lawyers should be advised on a regular basis of . . . the importance of each individual in
the organization conducting himself or herself in a way that maximizes the chance that the privilege will be
maintained.”).
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resolution of substantive law ambiguities. Moreover, many issues present a
choice between formal and functional definitions of the client. The trend seems to
be toward functional definition. When the lawyer’s role is situated in the broader
context of relevant law, it is apparent that the value of confidentiality is much
smaller than discussion usually suggests and that related objections to reporting-
out duties are overblown.
524 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 29:489
APPENDIX: VARIATIONS ON MODEL RULE 1.13
Rules Resembling old Rule 1.13 that refer to reporting up as permissive and do
















Rules Resembling new Rule 1.13 that refer to reporting up as presumptively









































*  Reporting out permitted only if allowed by Rule 1.6.
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